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Introduction
There are only two types of people today, those who are talking about China
and those who are not.
The rise of China has thrown open many important and interesting
questions: Will a strong China behave responsibly in world affairs,
complying with the rules and norms of the -intemaOOnaI community"?
Or will it defy ·universal standards-, and fight instead for its own
interests and those of the developing world, thereby posing a
serious challenge to the global order dominated by the West?
This book takes a look at China's responsibility in world affairs
by scrutinising its compliance with international rules and norms,
embodied in the treaties that it has signed or ratified, especially in
the areas of trade, arms control and disannament, the protection of
the environment, and human rights. The book examines China's
compliance within the context of Sino-United States relations, as the
US is heavily involved in monitoring China's compliance behaviour
in world affairs.
I Mike Moore, former Prime Minister of New Zealand and former Director-General
of the World Trade OrgarUsation, Sowb atna Momt"& Post. 9 December 2004.
p. A19.
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Compliance is central to the long-term sustainability of a state's
international obligations. Yet not much research has been done on
the concept of compliance in international studies, much less on its
impact on state behaviour, in view of the growing volume of inter-
national relations literature. There is close to nothing written on
China's compliance in a comprehensive manner, despite China's
growing importance in the global political economy. Two slight
exceptions to this phenomenon are the works of Ann Kent and
Wendy Frieman. Kent published in 1999 a judicious account of the
limits of compliance in China's participation in United Nations
human rights regimes in a book entitled China, the United Nations,
and human righrs. 2 It has remained the standard in this specific area
of study, although new developments may warrant a thorough
update. Similarly, Frieman published in 2004 a book entitled China,
arms e01zlral. and non-prolijeration,3 giving a fairly up-to-date and
pleasantly candid and balanced account of China's compliance
behaviour, among other things. I draw some useful insights from
this book to form the basis of some of my own analyses in Chapter 5
on arms control. Apart from these two books, there are other book-
length treatments and journal articles which discuss one or more of
the four issue areas covered in this book. However, they do not
dwell specifically on the issue of compliance. For example,
Elizabeth Economy's many writings on China's environment, includ-
ing her book entitled The river runs black,4 published in 2004,
provide some stimulating thoughts. Also, books with chapters cover-
ing some of the issue areas discussed in this book include those
written by Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross,S lain Johnston and
1 Ann K~nt. China, tbe United Nations, and burnan rights: the limits ofcompliance
(Philadelphia: University of P~nnsylvaniaPress, 1999).
3 Wendy Fri~man. China, arms control, and non-proliferation (London and New
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 20(4).
4 Elizabeth Economy, The river nms black: the environmental cballenge to China's
future (Ithaca and London: CorncU University Press, 20(4).
~ Andrew Nathan and Raben Ross, The Great Wall and the emptyfo~ (N~w
York and London: W.W. Nonon & Co., 1997).
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Robert Ross,6 Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg,' David
Lampton,8 and others.
This book is likely to be the first of its kind to take on as its
central theme China's rule compliance in international relations
covering the four crucial areas of trade, arms control, environmental
protection, and human rights by a single author. It will be of interest
to graduate students and specialists in contemporary Chinese affairs,
international relations and law, world trade, security and strategic
studies, environmental studies, and the studies of human rights.
How can we assess China's responsibility in global affairs? This
question begs a close examination of China itself: it is the largest
developing country in the world, currently undergoing a difficult
transition from a socialist party-state to embrace a market-orientated
economy. It is a country with a long history and dvilisation, in an
arduous process of integrating itself with the established global
political-economic order largely designed, nurtured, and controlled
by the liberal-democratic West. The stark contrast between China's
worldview as an underdog in this global order and that of the West
as the top dog can hardly be underestimated when assessing China's
responsibility and compliance in world affairs.
In this book, I first of all define the terms "responsibility" and
"compliance" in global affairs. I then assess China's global compli-
ance by looking at its treaty accession, followed by an assessment of
its compliance behaviour in the four specific areas of international
affairs: arms control and non-proliferation, trade and economics,
human rights, and environmental protection. These four areas repre-
sent important issues of security, trade, humanity, and ecology that
form the core of international relations today. They also represent
important areas of global activities in ~hich China is increasingly
~ Alastair Jain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (ed....), Engaging China: the managt>menl
ofan emerging pot.l.lt'r(London and New York: Routledge, 1999), chapters 9 and 10.
7 Elizabeth Economy and Michd Oksenberg (eds), China joins lbe uJOrld: progress
and prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
II David M. Umpton (ed>, The malnng ofChi~ foreign and securily policy in I~
etT.I afreform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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involved and in which other major countries in the world, the
United States in particular, have a great stake in trying to maintain
the status quo. The book concludes by suggesting that China's com-
pliance behaviour in world affairs has shown some marked
improvements, but much more work remains to be done if such
behaviour is to meet the standards demanded by the West in general
and the United States in particular.
In thinking through some of the issues discussed in the book, I
have been agonising for some time over whether I should use the
phrase wChina's international relations" or "Chinese international
relations". The fonner phrase gives the impression that China is a
single political entity - the Chinese state in this case - whereas
the use of the word "Chinese" in "Chinese international relations"
opens up an array of entities to include not only the People's
Republic of China (PRe) as a single political unit, but also Chinese
thinking, Chinese style, Chinese political philosophy, and much
more, apart from other Chinese political actors such as individuals,
groups, and local governments. In my usage in the folloWing analy-
sis, the word "China" sometimes carries the wider connotation as to
mean things "Chinese".
The book is organised in two parts. Part I, a theoretical part in
the main, consists of three chapters. The first, Chapter 1, discusses
the idea of responsibility from a Chinese perspective: how China
perceives as its responsibility in global affairs. It explores China's
understanding of its responsibility based on its national conditions: a
huge population; a nuclear power; a permanent member of the UN
Security Council; a participant in many international organisations;
and a contributor as well as a recipient of foreign aids. Inevitably its
recent history leaves an indelible mark on its perception. Chapter 2
defines the concept of responsibility, both from a Chinese perspec-
tive and from a Western perspective. It looks into China's participa-
tion in international organisations in some details, as a way to show
that China's responsibility in global affairs can be seen from, among
other things, its participation in the activities of international organi-
sations. Chapter 3 moves from responsibility to compliance, a con-
cept which has its origins in international law, but has now attracted
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the attention of an increasing number of political scientists. The
chapter explains what is meant by compliance and assesses China's
compliance in global affairs by scrutinising its accession to interna-
tional treaties. This chapter prOVides an overview of China's involve-
ment in the international treaty system, paving the way for a more
detailed analysis of China's compliance in the four issue areas,
discussed indiVidually in the four chapters forming Part U.
Chapter 4 in Part II discusses the first case, China's wro
compliance. Potentially the world's largest trading nation, China has
become a member of the World Trade OrganL<;ation since December
2001, pledging to abide by its rules. The extent to which it is willing
to comply, and is capable of complying, with WTO rules has impor-
tant implications for world trade. The chapter reveals the difficulties
faced by China, as a professed responsible rising power, in trying to
adjust itself to adhere to the global trading norm. It examines the
theory of compliance in international relations from the perspectives
of neo-realism, liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism,
and tests these theoretical perspectives by examining the mecha-
nisms used to gauge China's compliance, both bilaterally by the
United States and multilaterally through the Dispute Senlement
Mechanism and the Transition Review Mechanism of the wro. The
result of such an examination is mixed: different opinions exist as to
how compliant China has been. On the whole, most monitors agree
that China has made a lot of efforts in trying to comply with wro
requirements in various areas, but much more work remains to be
done. The most severe tests will come in a few years' time when
China's financial and service sectors will have to face fundamental
changes to the way they operate.
As a nuclear power, how China behaves in arms control and
disarmament will have a significant impact on the global strategic
balance of power. Since the 1980s, the US has accused some
Chinese entities, many of them state-owned enterprises, of selling
weapons of mass destruction or their technologies to "rogue" states
such as North Korea, Iran, Libya, and others, including due-use tech-
nologies which have both commercial and military applications.
Chapter 5 looks into China's compliance in arms control, disarmament,
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and non-proliferation, especially in the areas of weapons of mass
destruction: biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, together
with their delivery systems. It gives a historical background to
China's nuclear weapon development and its participation in inter-
national arms control regimes. China's compliance behaviour in this
area is complicated by the apparent move by the US away from
multilateralism to unilateralism in arms control and other areas.
As the most populous country on earth with ten per cent of its
rare species of flora and fauna, China's environmental practice is of
global concern. Already the country is one of the most polluted
places on earth. At least seven out of the ten most polluted cities in
the world are located in China. It is the second largest prcxlucer of
greenhouse gases after the United States, inflicting heavy, long-term
casualries on its own public health and economic development as
well as those of iL') close neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region. How
to strike a right balance between environmental protection and fast
economic growth will have an important impact on its mcxlernisa-
tion outcome and its international standing. The country began to
pay serious anention to environmental problems in the 1970s. Since
the adoption of the reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s,
it has signed or ratified many international treaties dealing with
environmental issues. By now, it has entered into many major inter-
national environmental regimes. Chapter 6 addresses these ques-
tions: How compliant is China with respect to commitments it has
made, if any, to these regimes? How willing and capable is it in
complying with international environmental norms and rules? What
does sustainable development mean to China? How do red tape,
fear, inexperience, and ignorance affect China's efforts to protect its
environment? And how do inter-ministerial wrangling and the
growth of green non-governmental organisations in China affect its
compliance in environmental affairs?
The issue of China's human rights remains a bone of contention
between China and the West. It has a negative spilJ~ver effect on
other issues and other aspects of China's bilateral relations with
Western countries. China's views on human rights are at odds with
those of the West. It stresses the importance of relativism, economic
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rights and developmental rights, in contrast to the West's emphasis
on universal, civil, and political rights. It argues that the observance
of human rights should take into account different stages of devel-
opment of individual societies. Despite these and other differences,
China none the less moves closer to embrace the universality of
rights and has started to engage in numerous human rights dia-
logues with other countries. After a brief introduction to the growth
of human rights awareness in the contemporary world and in China,
Chapter 7 gives a background to the divergent views on human
rights between China and the West. This introduction and back-
ground pave the way for a discussion of China's engagement with
international human rights regimes, focusing on China's compliance
or otherwise with the rules and norms embodied in those regimes.
The chapter analyses China's bilateral human rights relations with
the outside world, particularly with the US and the EU. It also takes
stock of what China has done so far to further its human rights
discourse.
The concluding chapter brings together the findings of previous
ones and compares China's compliance behaviour across the four
issue areas. China's overall compliance behaviour seems to be satis-
factory, although a lot of work needs to be done in order to
improve its compliance record and to meet the standard.. demanded
hy the West, especially by the United States. China's ability to make
improvements depends on, among other things, its ability to tackle
its many domestic problems.
The overall thrust of this l"xX>k is to examine what China has
done so far to <:omply with the treaties it has entered into in the four
issue areas, including the submission of progress reports to relevant
multilateral institutions, cooperation with outside inspection and
scrutiny, the passing of domestic legislation to fall in line with
international standard.., and the setting up of institutions and proce-
dures to cope with the required changes under its treaty obligations.
Given the different nature of these four issues and the different
priorities attached to them by different countries and organisations,
the treatment of China's compliance behaviour in these areas will be
somewhat uneven.
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Central to any analysis of the compliance behaviour of a state
are several basic questions: Who sets the rules and standards of
global compliance? What are the mechanisms available to states and
multilateral institutions to ensure state compliance? Who controls
those mechanisms? And how fair and just are the rules and
standards?
This book does not pretend to hold all the answers to the
questions posed in this Introduction, but by offering a wholesome
analysis of an area of growing importance and interest, I hope to be
able to chart some of the main features in the field and to indicate
some directions for future research. In the final analysis, this study
aims to fmd out if China's compliance behaviour has anything to
inform us or help us to improve our understanding of international
relations in a globalised world.
Throughout the book, Chinese and Japanese personal names are
presented with their surnames first, followed by their given names.
The currencies cited are in US dollars unless otherwise stated.
Chapter
1
The Idea of Responsibility:
China Looking Inside Out
China could well be the second-largest, if no( the Wgest, tr.lding nation in
the world, with greater weight and voice in international affairs. This is one
vision of China in SO years - modern, confident, and ''f!S/JO"Sibie.
Minlsler Mentor Lee Kuan Yew ofSingapore!
Is China a responsible state in international society? This is an
increasingly interesting and useful question, as China grows strong
and as it plays an increasingly greater role in world affairs. To
answer the question, it would be appropriate to consider flfSt the
follOWing basic questions:
• ~t is meant by responsibility?
• How to assess the responsibility of a state?
•
• What is China's responsibility?
• To whom is China responsible?
I Quoted in Laurence J. Brahm, China's century: tbe awaltening of the next
economic powerhouse (Singapore: John WIley &: Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., 2001), back
jacket. Emphasis mine.
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• What international society are we talking about?
• Why raise the issue of China's responsibility now?
WHAT IS MEANT BY RESPONSmIUIY?
According to The concise Oxford dictionary, the word "responsible"
means:
1. liable to be called to account (to a person or for a thing);
2. morally accountable for one's actions; capable of rational
conduct; and
3. of good credit, position, or repute; respectable; evidently
trustworthy.
Seemingly the word "responsible" or "responsibility" carries legal,
moral, as well as social connotations, and since legal, moral, and social
standards vary across cultures, to a greater or lesser extent, the concept
of responsibility would inevitably be laden with value judgements:
responsibility refers to something ethical or desirable.
The word "responsibility" comes from the Latin word respondea,
meaning "I answer". 2 It is synonymous to answerability and
accountabiIity.3 Its equivalent in Chinese is zeren. The flfSt charac-
ter, ze, carries a sense of burden, and the second character, ren,
carries that of duty. In traditional China, duties and burdens are
handed down or assigned by superiors and elders to their juniors
and the young in a hierarchically-structured society. Duties and bur-
dens also come with certain social and occupational positions
within a family or in the wider community. There are certain duties
that one is expected to perform and burdens that one has to shoul-
der. In other words, there are things that an individual, as a member
of a family or community, ought to do. This word ought carries a
2 LR. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 5, cited in Toni
Erskine (ed), Can institutions have responsibility? Collective moral agency and
international relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
} Andrew Heywood, Key concepts in politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 20(0),
p.145.
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moral conviction rather than a legal obligation. It has a strong ethical
underpinning nurtured by centuries of culture and tradition.
Indeed morality plays an important part in Chinese foreign-
policy behaviour, depending on the time and the circumstances in
which events take place. As Shih Chih-yu has skilfully argued,
Chinese leaders often "present themselves as the supreme
moral rectifiers of the world order".4 He gives the following
examples in international politics during the O:>ld War to support his
argument:s
• China's policy towards the Soviet Union was aimed primarily at
shaming the Soviets for their betrayal of socialism;
• Its United States policy demonstrates China's anti-imperialist
integrity;
• Its Japan policy blames the Japanese for a failed Asiatic brother-
hood; and
• Its Third World policy is intended to be a model for emulation.
To the traditional Chinese mind, responsibility flows from something
that one owes to others. The Chinese leaders today probably think
that they owe lirne or nothing to the outside world or, for that mat-
ter, countries in the West. Rather, it is the West that owes them a
huge "debt-, because Western imperialists exploited China and
humiliated the Chinese people for over a hundred years before
1949. Why then should China be responsible to the outside world,
or to the West, since it does not owe them anything? On the con-
trary, it is the West which should be held responsible to China, for
what Western powers had done to the country in the past. As a first
step, Western countries should refrain from interfering in China's
domestic affairs.
Some Western analysts have pointed out that Chinese leaders
are using this kind of "victimhood" to drum up domestic support for
their policies and to shore up their bargaining position with Western
• Shih QUh-yu, Chlna:S just world: ~ mOrWtty ofChtnese foretgn policy (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 243.
~ Ibid.
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powers by shaming them.6 Some even suggest that the "culture of
shame and humiliation" is a "nationalist myth".' However, to the
many Chinese who have suffered enormously, physically or men-
tally, directly or indirectly, it was and is very real. The fad that the
story of Western exploitation of China and the lessons to be learnt
from it have been passed on from one generation to another as a
painful reminder to the Chinese nation and people does suggest that
it is a factor to be taken into account when dealing with China and
in assessing its global responsibility.s
HOW TO ASSESS TIlE RESPONSmnnY OF A STATE?
One common way to assess the responsibility of a state and hence
its credibility is to scrutinise what it does rather than what it says. In
other words, a state could be judged by its deeds and its adions.
But who is in a position to pass judgement? Is the United Nations'
Security Council, or its General Assembly, or its International Court
of Justice in a good position to do so? Are countries in the West or
those in the East in a bener position to do so? Those in the North or
in the South? Some powerful states? Or some form of international
regimes? How valid are their judgements if they do pass them? We
know that there is no complete consensus on these issues among
states, not even among a group of like-minded states. We live in a
world in which there are little completely accepted principles of
international common law, except perhaps the UN Charter. But even
some of the fundamental prinCiples of the UN Charter are under
6 Steven Gold<;tein, quoted in CNN news at hnp://cnn.com/SPEClALS/l9991
chma.SO/asian.superpower/neighborsl
7 Michael Yahuda, ·China's foreign relations: the Long March, future unceruin,· The
China Quarterly, No. 159 (September 1999), p. 652. Ishihaf2 Shintaro, a fonner
right-wing Liberal Democratic Party member of the Diet (Parliament) and currently
the Governor of Tokyo, once rejected outright the existence of the Nanjing Incident
in 1937 as a fabrication. Ishihara is but one among many extreme right-wing
nationalists in Japan.
/I Chen Jie, ·China's Spratly policy: As1an Suroey, Vol. 34, No. 10 (October 1994),
p,894.
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dispute. For example, member states of the UN are divided as to
whether humanitarian intervention should override national sover-
eignty.9 Some states choose to follow some rules while breaking
others, whether they relate to human rights, trade, or political sover-
eignty. What is responsible to some may appear to be irresponsible
to others. International responsibility is by and large a product of
international civic awareness, but is very much grounded in and
defined by local cultures and ideologies and is therefore severely
contested. to If absolute or complete consensus is so difficult to
achieve, then perhaps relative or near consensus may be achievable.
Very often it is based on some sort of relative or near consensus that
a group of like-minded states take collective action to tackle world
problems. Sometimes it requires a strong power to take the lead to
galvanise or forge a collective action.
To the Chinese mind, the linkage between power and responsi-
bility depends on one's position in a scheme of things. It is unerly
important to position oneself properly: only when one's position is
properly established and "named" can one behave in a "correct" or
righteous way.ll The idea of dingwei or positioning therefore
becomes significant in determining one's behaviour. Apart from
positioning, the term dingwei can also mean the search for a place,
the seeking of a proper role, or the going through of a process of
negotiation to firm up one's position, thereby enabling one to avoid
potential conflicts in the future. Because of the Chinese sense of
history and collective memory, it is not inconceivable to assume that
the idea of dingwei can be extended from China's domestic situation
to its view of the world.
9 Frank Ching, "UN: sovereignry or rights?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 21
October 1999, p. 40.
10 Personal communication with Dr Ray Goldstein. School of Political Science and
International Relations, Victoria Universiry of Wellington, New Zealand, 8 October
1999.
11 A traditional Confucian thought, deriving from the popular saying that mingzbeng,
)'2nsbun, meaning roughly that "j( one's name (meaning title) is properly given, then
one's words can~ righteous".
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The Chinese sense of responsihility is very much tied to one's
position of power, as indicated by the saying that quanti yu yiwu
jundeng, which can be roughly translated as and represented by the
follOWing approximation:
Duty + Burden:::: Power + Privileges
where yiwu should be understood as "appropriate" work (i.e.
duty + burden) in the traditional meaning of the term, rather than
"voluntary" work.
It is useful to make a distinction between two forms of power:
power as of right, which is derived from one's proper positioning in
a social setting; and power as of might, which is an empirical sub-
stance. The wielding of power can therefore be righteous when
exercised from a proper position, hut can he hegemonic and imperi-
alistic and therefore morally corrupt when exercised for the purpose
of selfish gains without rightful entitlement according to some sets
of moral principles. In this way, the conflict between China and the
West may not he purely over material interests or relative power
gains, but may also be over ideologies and moral principles, more
so than most people would readily give credit to.
What is China's international position will therefore affect how it
is going to behave, to exercise it" power, and to fulfil its "responsi-
hilities". To the Chinese thinking, China's position in the world is
buttressed by its power relative to others, and hence there is a need
to understand and to determine accurately its comprehensive
national power and those of other countries so that China can know
where it stands in relation to others and how it should relate to or
behave towards them. 12
Although the concept of comprehensive national power is
difficult to define and its measurement lacks predsion,13 its utility, to
12 Apart from Confucian inOuence, this line of Chinese thinking can abo be allrib-
Uled to the teachings of the famous Chinese strategist Sun Tze, author of The al'1 of
u'ar: "Knowing well one's own situation and the situation of other.;, fight a hundred
banles and be able to win them all.·
lj For a discussion of China's comprehensive national power, see Gerald Chan.
Chinese perspectillf!s on international relations: a frameworll for analysis
<Basingstoke: Macmillan. 19(9), pp. 30-33.
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some Chinese analysts, lies in its ability to serve as a rough guide to
assess one's position of strength in the world. One of the reasons
why this concept has become so popular among Chinese analysts
these days is that, since China is growing strongly, there is a need to
take stock of its powers and evaluate its power base. Here of course
we are dealing with something fuzzy rather than with something
clear and precise, as the power of a state is difficult to measure and
as the situation of the world constantly changes. Hard power, such
as military hardware, is relatively more static and is easier to meas-
ure, while soft power, such as culture or morality, is more fluid and
hence more difficult to measure.
WHAT IS CHINA'S RESPONSmII..ITY?
If we follow the Chinese line of thinking about dingwei di went;
(the issue of positioning), then we need, fust of all, to ask what
China's global position is, before we attempt to make an assessment
of its global responsibility. The mention of China conjures different
images to different people, depending on their different standpoints.
Some of the salient features of China's position may include the
following:
• China has a huge population;
• It is a nuclear power;
• It is a permanent member of the Security Council of the United
Nations;
• It is a member of many important international organisations;
and
• It is a contributor as well as a recipient of aids.
Any assessment of China itself, let alone its responsibilities, must
start with an understanding of China in the recent past, a China that
had suffered for 100 years under Western imperialism,14 followed by
periods of internal strife, civil wars, and Japanese invasion, and then
14 Michael Yahuda, "China's search for a global role: Current History, Vol. 98,
No. 629 (September 1999), p. 266.
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30 years of excesses under revolutionary, communist rule. It has
only begun to open up to the outside world, more "voluntarily" than
before, since the late 1970s, and has by now attained some degree
of normality and stability. However, China faces many difficulties in
its development path: apart from its huge population, on the whole
it is still a relatively backward developing country in the midst of
drastic and fundamental socioeconomic changes.15 It is still a country
suffering from, among other things, some sort of domestic political
insecurity, arising out of crises of identity and legitimacy.16 What can
one expect of China's international behaviour?
A huge population. The task of feeding and sheltering the
country's 1.3 billion people has not been easy. The government is
determined to eradicate poverty, limit population growth, and raise
the living standard of its people, to the extent that it argues that the
rights to subsistence is more important than individual freedoms.
Deng Xiaoping once reminded us that if the Chinese were starving
and forced to flee their home country in search for food elsewhere,
would it not cause problems for the neighbouring region and the
world at large? The world therefore has an interest to see that
China can lift its people out of abject poverty and that the country
can remain stable. In a speech made at Cambridge University in
October 1999, President Jiang Zemin said that "to ensure [the rights
to subsistence and development! for our people is in itself a major
contribution to the progress of the world's human rights cause".17 To
achieve the goals of modernisation and to raise the living standard
of its people, China has opened its doors and adopted new
economic measures since the late 1970s, irlcluding the establishment
15 Jia Qingguo, "Economic development, political stability and international
respect,· journal ofInternational Affairs, Vol. 49, No.2 (Winter 1996), pp. 573-576.
16 Wang Fei-Ung, "Self-image and strategic intentions: national confidence and
political insecurity,· in Deng Yong and Wang Fei-Ling (eds), In the eyes of the
dragon: China views the world (Lanham: Rowman & Uttlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1999), chapter 2. Some of Wang's ideas are further developed in Deng Yong and
Wang Fei-Ling (cds), China rising: power and motivation in Chinese foreign po/icy
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005).
17 Evening Post, Wellington, 23 October 1999, p. 8.
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of Special Economic Zones and the opening up of coastal and
regional cities to foreign trade and investment. The joining of
the World Trade Organisation in 2001 is another major step in this
direction.
A mu:lear power. China's successful testing of its first atomic
bomb in 1964 boosted the morale of a people who had suffered and
sacrificed so much. The depth of pride felt by its people, including
those living overseas, that it could join the rank of nuclear powers,
was hard to fathom. China prides itself not only as a nuclear power,
but also as a country which has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, in September 1996. 18 In the wake of the Pakistani and Indian
missile and nuclear tests in April and May 1998, there were rumours
that China might reconsider its treaty obligations and resume
nuclear testing. China faces great strategic and military challenges,
as it shares long borders with 14 countries on land and seven
maritime neighbours. Of these, three are nuclear (Russia, India, and
Pakistan), one declares it possesses nuclear weapons (North Korea),
and three with potentials to develop them Qapan, South Korea, and
Taiwan). On 3 June 1998, President Jiang Zemin pledged, in his first
public reaction to the tests in South Asia, that "China has no inten-
tion of restarting its nuclear tests" .19 Either as a strategic move or as
a responsible gesture to maintain world peace, China has also
pledged not to use nuclear weapons first and has asked or even
challenged other nuclear powers to do likewise. So far, it has not
stationed a single soldier or held military exercises outside its
18 China has yet to ratify it. The Treaty needs to be ratified by the 44 nuclear-capable
states. Twenty-six have ratified, 15 have signed but not ratified, including the US,
and three (India, North Korea, and Pakistan) have not even Signed. See Times
magazine, 25 October 1999. p. 20. As of May 2005. neither China nor the US has
ratified, and India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not yet signed. See the website
of the Comprehensive Te t Ban Treaty Organisation, http://www.etbto.org/
(accessed 14 June 2(05).
19 South China Morning Post, 4 June 1998. Earlier, an anonymous senior official of
the Foreign Ministry in Beijing was quoted as saying that China would consider
resuming tests if the nuclear arms tension between India and Pakistan worsened
(ibid., 2 June 1998).
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claimed territorial boundaries,2o apart from peacekeeping activities
under UN auspices or limited drills with members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation.
As a regional power, China has initiated the Six-Party talks to fmd
ways to end the conflict in the Korean Peninsula, especially North
Korea's nuclear ambitions. It has joined and actively participated in
regional security dialogues, such as the Asean Regional Forum and
the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and in
regional economic groupings, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum and the Pacific Economic Cooperative Council. In
the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98, it resisted temptations to
devalue its currency, as devaluation might trigger off another round
of crisis. Consequently, China had to endure temporarily a dimin-
ished share of its export market and a loss in economic competitive-
ness. It made financial contributions to help some neighbouring
countries affected by the crisiS.21 In April 2005, it hosted the Boao
Forum on Haman Island to discuss economic issues and joined the
Asia-African summit held in Jakarta. The summit resolved to enhance
economic cooperation between countries across the two continents,
to alleviate poverty, and to form a united front to tackle world trade
negotiations.22 One exception to this apparently responsible image
of China is its policy towards Taiwan. It has steadfastly refused to
give up the use of arms to reunify Taiwan. In March 2005, its
Parliament, the National People's Congress, passed an anti-secession
law to authorise the government to use force if Taiwan declares formal
independence. Neighbouring countries are very worried that a war
across the Taiwan Strait would seriously destabilise the Asia-Pacific
region and disrupt its economic growth.
.A perrlUJlIeNl member oftbe UN Security Council. As one of
the five permanent members with veto power, China can influence
20 It was re(X>rted in May 2005 that China and Kirgyzstan held talks to set up a
military base in Kirgyzstan, http://www.akipress.org.
21 for example. China contributed one billion US dollars as part of an lMf effort to
bailout Thailand's financial woe.
12 Radio Hong Kong Channel 4 news, 24 April 2005.
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China's Compliance in Global Affairs
China needs to foUow "the rule of law and to be exposed to the powerful
forces of free enterprise systems and democracy·.
US Secretary ofStale Co/.in Pvweu, 2001\
The Uniled States wanes to become both rule maker and aroitrator of the game.
China Daily, 2001 2
dosely related to the idea of responsibility is the idea of compliance,
a concept lying at the very hean of international relations and
international law. Originally coming from legal studies, it has now
attracted the attention of many political scientists,3 as the role played
by international institutions in world affairs gains in imponance after
the Cold War. This chapter stans by defining first of all the concept
of compliance and then examines China's accession to international
treaties, thus providing a prelude to an analysis of China's compliance
with the rules and norms embodied in those treaties covering the
four issue areas in the following chapters in Pan n. .
\ QuOCed in As1a~ 30 March-6 April 2001, p. 38.
2 Quoted in the People's Daily, Internet ed, 22 February 2001.
3 See the growing number of articles on oornpUance in such academic journals as
Inlernaltonal Organtzalton and the.A~n Polt&al Sciena RerMw.
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WHAT IS GWBAL COMPIJANCEl
Compliance is an act of implementing and enforcing agreements
made. It is a correspondence between behaviour and agreed rules. 04
As a result of globalisation and interdependence of one kind or
another among states and non-state actors, a growing body of rules
and nonns is made to govern international behaviour. Some of these
rules and nonns are set in formal ways. Others, in increasing numbers,
are informal or "soft" in nature, like declarations, communiques, and
memoranda of understanding. In comparison, these rules are more
fluid and less well-defined than "hard" laws such as treaties.
Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler-Chayes are among the earlier
groups of scholars who argue that absolute state sovereignty has
been checked by the growth of regimes in that states increasingly
find it necessary to comply with the rules of these regimes, rules
that set limits to their independence and freedom of action.5 Other
scholars, like George Downs and his associates, probe the idea of
compliance further and fmd that there is a correspondence between
deeper compliance and greater enforcement.6 That is to say, greater
• Individual compliance in social life can be traced to classical philosophy in the
West. Friedrich Kratochwil puts classical theories into three groups: the flfSt group
is the Hobbesian or realisl position which derives compliance with norms from
force or the threat of force. A second group explains compliance in tenns of the
long-term utilitarian calculations of actors, a perspective perhaps best identifies
with Hume's argument about the nature of conventions. The third group is the ide-
alist position of Durkheim, who conceptualises norms and rules as ·social facts·
existing objectively and constraining individual choices. Cited by !sao Miyaoka,
'State compliance with intematiorutl legitimate norms: wildlife preservationist pres-
sures on Japanese fIShing,' paper presented at the 41st Annual Convenlioo of the
International Studies Association, Los Angeles, 14-18 March 2000, in Columbia
International Affairs Online, http://www.ciaoner.org/isa (assessed 3 March 2003).
~ Many of the early writings by Chayes and Chayes on international regimes
that appear in IntemaltonaJ OrgantzaNorl have been collected and published in
Abraham Olayes and Ant0ni2 Handler-Otayes, The new~nJy:compliance wUh
tnJernaJionaJ reguJalory agreements (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
6 George W. Downs, 'Enforcement and the evolution of cooperation,' MtcbiBart
journm oflnJernalionai Law, Vol. 19, No.2 09(8), pp. 319-344; George W. Downs,
David Rocke, and Peter Barsoom, 'Is the good news about compliance good news
about cooperation?' InJernalionalOrgantzatlon, Vol. SO, No.3 (996), pp. 379-406.
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enforcement by regimes is necessary to exact state compliance in
areas of deep integration and cooperation, because there is always a
tendency for domestic actors to foul compliance rules, for example,
in setting up trade barriers against free trade. Assessing compliance
is difficult, as states dispute over what really makes compliance,
especially when the rules are not very clear<Ut due to the vague-
ness of the meanings of the terms used, as in many "soft" rules. In
addition, concepts such as "political will", "trust", and "negotiation
posture", upon which compliance decisions are made and based,
are very difficult to measure.7 Hence the degree of state compliance
is often open to different interpretations.
Furthermore, most international treaties and organisations have
little or no teeth with which to enforce their rules, and so rule
compliance in many instances becomes a gentlemen's agreement.8
Even in the case of the rulings of the World Court (the International
Court of Justice), states can choose to ignore its rulings as they are
non-binding. In general, some states choose to comply with some
rules in some issues at some times, while others do not. As a result,
state behaviour varies across time and space. Inevitably scholars
have disputed over the extent of state compliance. Some, like Louis
Henkin, argue that probably "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of tbeir obligations
almost all of the time [emphasis in originaU".9 Other scholars, like
Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt, found evidence to the contrary.
They found, for example, that the total non<ompliance with GAlT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) panel rulings approached
7 Jana von Stein, 'Do tre2ties conslrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compli-
ance,' American PoItlicaI Sdenu Review, forthcoming, quoting the works ofJames
Vreeland.
8 Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, The Heritage Foundation, speaking at the "OUna
2020 Vision- conference held at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, The
Chatham House, London, 30 March 2004.
9 Louis Henkin, How rtaIions beIH:we.. Jaw andftwetBn polk:y, 2nd ed (New Yorit:
Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 47, cited in Ka1 Raustiala and Anne-Marie
Slaughter, 'International law, international relations and compliance,' in Walter
Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (eds). Handbooll of inlerrUJlionlll
relaOOns (London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), p. 540.
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30 per cent, and almost 60 per cent of rulings failed to elicit full
compliance. 10
The picture of global compliance is uneven and rather complex,
since the nature of international politics is largely anarchical, meaning
the absence of a central goverrunent at the global level comparable to
goverrunents at the national level. There is no one in an authoritative
position to make a definitive judgement that would be acceptable to,
let alone binding on, all states or even the majority of states.
Consequently, what is compliance to some may not be regarded as
such by others. Seen in this light, the nature of compliance and the
standards for measuring compliance are by and large relative rather
than absolute.
Why do states sometimes choose to comply then? In general,
states are induced to do so because, in their overall strategic assess-
ment, positive outcomes resulting from compliance outweigh nega-
tive ones. It is on the whole a rational calculation, rational in the
sense that states would weigh the pros and cons carefully, based on
information available to decision-makers. It is, however, a limited
rationality. The fundamentals upon which calculations are made can
change over time and over different issues when perceptions
change or when new information is made available to dedsion-
makers. In addition, decisions to comply or not to comply are in the
main based on a combination of domestic and international
factors. ll The domestic factors may include the democratic fonn of
government, leaders' conunitment to certain course of action that
favours compliance, and administrative and economic capaCity. It is
generally assumed that the more democratic a country is, the more
compliant it will be with international rules and norms. This correla-
tion is based on the observation that the general public and NGOs
10 Cited in lUustiala and Slaughter, 'InternationaJ law, international relations and
compliance,' p. 549.
II Peter M. Haas, 'Choosing to comply: theorizing from international relations and
comparative politics,' in Dinah Shelton (ed), Commilment and romp/lana: tN role
ofnon-bindtng nonn.s In the tntemattonallegaJ system (Oxford: Oxford University
~,~),pp.4~.
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are able to put pressure on governments to comply. However,
exceptions to this observation exist, as instances can be found in
which authoritative governments can marshal enough resources in
order to adhere to specific rules and norms that they see as
beneficial to their countries. The administrative and economic
capacity relates to the resources and technological know-how that a
country can muster in order to comply. The administrative capacity
is closely related to the level of education and training of bureau-
crats. The international factors, on the other hand, may include
the number of states involved in any compliance issue, the
distribution of power among those states, and the influence of
regimes on states,12 such as the strength of the regimes' monitoring
and verification process.13
How to deal with a country if it does not comply with international
agreements? Two major ways have been suggested: one, called the
"legalistic" school, stresses the importance of legal compliance of
states. If states do not comply, then legal pressure should be
brought to bear on their non-compliance, including the use of
sanctions of various kinds available to complaining states to get
redress. The other is liberal in nature and can be named the "liberal"
school,14 which calls for a flexible, diplomatic solution to resolve
complaints arising out of non-eompliance. These two schools repre-
sent two opposite ways of dispute settlement. They spring from two
different philosophical approaches to dealing with the issue of
compliance: enforcement and managerialism. Managerialism is
12 Michael Faure and Jiirgen Lefevere, 'Compliance with international environmental
agreements,' in Norman J. Vig and Regifl2 S. Axelrod (eds), The global enutron-
menl: tnslitultons. law, and policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quanerly,
1999), pp. 141-144. For a study of international couns as regimes affeaing sute
compliance, see K.lren J. Alter, '00 international courts enhance compliance wilh
intemationallaw?' Review ofAsian and Pacijil: Studies., Seikei University Center for
Asian and Pacific Studies, Japan, No. 25 Quly 2(03), pp. 51-78.
n See also Edith Brown Weiss, 'Conclusions: understanding compliance with soft
law,' in Shelton (cd), CommUmenl and compliana, pp. 53~553.
14 Supachai Panitchpakdi ca1Is these two 5Chools the -litigation route- and the -policy
route- respectively, in his public leaure at the University of Hong Kong, 21 May 2002.
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based on "the premise that states have a propensity to comply with
their international commitments."ls When left alone, states are
inclined to comply and can manage well their compliance behaviour.
However, enforcement theorists think otherwise:16 external pressure
is reqUired to bring about state compliance.
Teall Crossen, a law researcher at the University of Calgary in
Canada, has compiled a useful bibliography on the compliance
literature. 17 Apart from the two major schools of thought mentioned
above - managerialism and enforcement, there are other theories
which help to explain compliance behaviour of states. These
include fairness theory, transnational legal process, reputational
theory, and international relations theory, among others. According
to Thomas Franck,18 fairness in law, based on legitimacy and equity,
encourages compliance. On the contrary, unfair laws are likely to
complicate the issue of compliance. Although international relations
theory, especially the neo-Iiberal school and constructivism,19 also
pays attention to the legitimate concerns of compliance issues, the
mainstream neo-realist school, however, puts much greater empha-
sis on interests, reputations, and institutions, especiaUy when power,
wealth, and position (position in the international system with
regard to states, and offices for individuals) are at stake.20 From the
perspective of foreign office officials, the promotion of state
interests and the preservation of state integrity are far more
15 R2ustiala and Slaughter, 'International law, international relations and compli-
ance,' in Carlsnaes, Risse, and Simmons (eds), Handbook of tnlernational
re1alWns, p. 542.
16 R2ustiala and Slaughter, pp. 542-544.
17 Teall Cro6sen, 'Responding to global wanrung: a critique of the Kyao Protocol
compliance regime: an annotated bibliography,' a paper accessed through the
Internet, April 2005.
181bomas Franck, Fatrness tn International law and tnsttluttons (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995),
19 Haas, 'Choosing to comply: theorizing from international relations and compara-
tive politics,' in Shelton (ed). Commttmenl and complttmu, pp. <4}-64.
10 Robert O. Keohane, 'International relations and International law: two optia,'
Harvard Internalicma/ LawJourna~Vol. 38 (997), pp. 487 fr.
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important than a strict adherence to legal norms.21 ReputationaI
theory, prop:>sed by Andrew Guzman,22 suggests that states do care
about potential damage to their reputation as a result of treaty viola-
tion, as well as the possibility of beirlg censured. States, however,
have multiple reputations, meaning that defection under one agree-
ment may not affect their observance of and their reputation under
another.23 Transnational legal process, however, is a process
through which an irlternational law or rule, beirlg deliberated at
irltemational forums, is subsequently irltemalised irlto domestic law
through the actions of transnational actors.24 There is, therefore, a
need to study the social, political, and legal processes through
which this process of irltemalisation works and the various actors
irlvolved, be they diplomats, academics, NGO advocates, or political
leaders.25
Most, if not all, of these theories are subject to how states or
their representative actors irlterpret compliance. A study of compli-
ance has reviewed that different states may rely on different stan-
dards of evidence, types of infonnation, and varyirlg defInitions of
what constitutes "significant" non-compliance.26 Examples of
different standards of evidence may irlclude such hard evidence
as a "smoking gun", or sufficient information so that the non-
compliance situation is "beyond reasonable doubt", or soft evidence
such as "a preponderance of evidence". Types of infonnation may
2\ Richard B. Bilder, 'Beyond compliance: helping nations cooperate,' in Shelton
(ed), CommUmenl and comp(ianu. pp. 67-73.
22 Andrew T. Guzman, 'A compliance-based theory of international12w,' California
Law Review, Vol. 90, No.6 (December 2002), pp. 1,823 fr.
2j Geo~ W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, 'Reputation, comp1i2nce, and interna-
tional12w,' 7bejournaJ ofLesal Studies, Vol. 31 (2002). pp. 9S fr.
24 Harold Hongju Koh, 'Why do nations obey international 12w?' Yale Law journal,
Vol. 106. No. 8 Quae 1997>. p. 2.599.
2S H2rold Hongju Kob, 'Bringing international law home,' Houston Law Review,
Vol. 35(998), p. 623.
J6 Michael MoodeI and Amy Sands, 'ln1roduction:~ approaches to cornpliantt
with arms control and non-proliferation agreements,' The Nonproliferalkm Revtew,
Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2001), Internet printOUt, p. 6.
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range from nationally collected intelligence, which is a source of
information gathering preferred by the United States, to open
resources. And "significant" non-eompliance can mean any of the
following five categories of violations:27
1. Minor technical or inadvertent problem;
2. Different interpretations or gaps in treaty language;
3. Significant, detected, overt violations;
4. Significant, detected, but covert violations; and
5. Suspected covert violations of possible significance.
'The application of different standards, on the other hand, can be
attributed to imprecise language, divergent texts or honest differences
of interpretation. The prejudice and ignorance of state actors also
contribute towards differences in opinion about compliance.28
How to test these divergent theories against China's compliance
behaviour? Detailed case studies are in order. As a first step towards
answering this question, it is necessary to examine China's treaty
accession in order to realise the extent to which China is involved in
rule compliance, rule interpretation, rule adjudication, and rule
making.
OIINA'S TREAlY ENGAGEMENT
Although China's entry into international agreements is a primary
measure of its global responsibility, there is a difference between
signing a treaty per se and adhering to the spirit of the treaty.29
l7 Ibid.
l8 Luke T. Lee, China and international agreements: a study of compltanu
(Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff; Durham, NC: Rule of Law Press, 1%9), p. 9.
29 Ann Kent has provided a useful list of ways to measure China's compliance in
human rights issue. See her China, the United Nations, and human rights
(Philadelptilil, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 7. Another recent
publication has also provided a general framework for assessing compliance. See
Shelton (ed), Commitment and compltame, especially the chapter by Ihas,
'Choosing to comply.'
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(The laner is, of course, an interesting and complex issue, but lies
beyond the immediate concern of this study.)30 Nevertheless, the
signing of a treaty (and its subsequent ratification) represents an ele-
mentary yet fundamental step towards treaty compliance. As of
2003, China is party to 266 international treaties, covering a wide
range of issues, from politics to economics, social to cultural, and
science to sports. An examination of the timing of China's accession to
these agreements reveals several interesting features (see Figure 3.1).
Firstly, the People's Republic of China (PRC) only started to
engage substantially with the multilateral treaty system since 1971,
the year in which it gained its seat in the United Nations. Before
that, from its establishment in 1949, China had only acceded to six
treaties, five in 1952 and one in 1958. The five treaties acceded to in
1952 were the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and the four Geneva
Conventions relating to certain humanitarian conducts during military
confliets.3' The single treaty acceded to in 1958 was the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
"'1llere are, however, quite a loe of useful studies 01 China's Jegal system and legal
culture. see, for example, /WldaU Peerenboom, Cbina ~ IonS march wward rule oj
law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2(02); Pitman B. Poaer, Tbt! Cbinese
kgaJ~ Slobalizalion and kxaI kgaJ culture (London; New Yorl<, Routledge,
200t); Karen Turner, James v. Feinerman, and R. Kent GUy (005), Tbt! /imils of lbe
",Ie of law In Cblna (seattle, University 01 Washington Press, 20(0); and Stanley
B. Lubman, Bird in a CDS'" kgaJ refonn in Cbina (Stanford, Stanford Univer.;ity
Press, 1999).
" These are the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment oC Prisoner.; 01 War,
the Genev2 Convention for the Amelioration 01 the Condition oC the Wounded Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces a' sea, the Gene-va Convention
Relative to the Proc.ection of Civilian Per.;ons in Time of War, and the Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration 01 the Condition oC the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field. The People's Republic 01 China declared in 1952 their
recognition oC those Conventions, but only ratified them in 1956 by the Standing
Committee oC the National People's Congress, The documenI signifying the ratilic:a-
tion 01 thne Conventions was deposited with the Red Cross authorities in
Switzerland later that year. For a detailed analySis oC Olina's relations with the
International Red Cross, see Gerald Chan, Cblna and InlenIalicnaJ Of'llanisal1ons
(Hong Kong, Oxford Unlver.;ity Press, 1989), chapter 5.
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Figure 3.1 China's Accession to International Treaties, 1949-2003
Source: Compiled from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 0( the PRC ('China's
participation in multilateral treaties', in Chinese) hnp://VllwW.fmprc.ROV.cnlchnlwjb/zzig/tyflsI
tfsckzJklzgcjddlxy/t8S211.htm (accessed 30 April 2005).
N()(e 1: The word "accession' is used here to refer to the signing of the treaty, its recognition,
ratification, or its becoming effective in and applicable to China. The year indicates, in most
cases, the year in which China signt"d the treaty or the treaty became effective in China.
N()(e 2: The total number of treaties acceded - 266.
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by Air. Hence, for two decades from 1949 to 1970, China was more
or less outside the international treaty system.
Secondly, the year 1971 marks a watershed in China's engagement
with the multilateral treaty system. Subsequent to its admission to
the UN, the country steadily gained entry into other specialised
agencies of the UN system. The treaties signed between 1971 and
1979 largely reflected China's increased participation in that system.
For example, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation was the first specialised agency to recognise the PRC,
on 29 October 1971, four days after it was admitted into the UN. In
1972, the Constitution of the World Health Organisation became
effective in and applicable to China. This was followed by others,
including the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the Universal
Postal Union, the World Meteorological Organisation, and the
International Maritime Organisation, aU in 1973; and the Convention
on International Civil Aviation and various subsequent Protocols
relating to the Amendments to the Convention in 1974.32
Thirdly, the surge in engagement with the multilateral treaty
system happened only after China adopted its reform and opening-up
policy. The year 1979 marked the first year in which China became
heavily involved in accession to international treaties, signing ten of
them that year followed by 18 a year later, reaching a peak of 21 in
1984. Many of the treaties recognised by the PRC in 1984 related to
workers' rights of various kinds under the purview of the
International Labour Organisation.33 In fact, the 1980s witnessed a
golden decade in China's accession to international treaties. The
Tiananmen Incident of 1989 did not seem to have dampened
China's enthusiasm in gaining entry into the multilateral treaty
}2 For the dates on which most of the UN specialised agendes recognised the PRe
subsequent to its admission to the UN, see Samuel S. Kim, Cbirw. tbe United
Nations. and world order (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 347.
H The government of the Republic of Chinll (the Nationalist government) signed
these treaties in 1936. And the PRC recognised them in 1984 and they became
effective in mainland China since then. See the website of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the PRC (under "Multilater.al Tre2ties". in "Treaties and Law")
hnpJ/www.frnprc.gov.cnIchn1premadel24475/dabian.hun (accessed 11 March 2(03).
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system, although the tempo since then seems to have slowed down
somewhat. This slowdown is due probably to the fact that there are
fewer treaties to be concluded at the global level, since the "easy"
topics on which there is Widespread consensus among nation-states
have been largely completed.~ All in all, the bulk of China's multi-
lateral treaties has been signed since 1979, some 231 out of 266,
representing about 87 per cent of all treaties that it has acceded to
since its establishment in 1949.35
Figure 3.2 indicates that China has increased substantially its
accession to international treaties and hence its participation in
international organisations since the 1970s, although there was a
small plateau between 1975 and 1979, coinciding with the death of
Mao Zedong and the political turmoil surrounding the rise and fall
of the so-called Gang of Four.36 From the point of view of rational
decision-making, it would be safe to assume that Chinese leaders
could have estimated that the benefits derived from an increase in
accession and participation must have outweighed the costs
involved. The costs obviously vary according to the terms of the
treaties concerned and the commiunents that China has to make as
a treaty member. Nonetheless China's behaviour in this respect
indicates the progress made in its national development, its readiness
}4 See Shelton (ed), Commitmem and compliance, p. 555.
35 The calculation is based on Figure 3.1. A full list of the treaties can be found in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. According to the UN, about 40,000 multi..lat-
eral treaties and international agreements have been deposited with the UN
Secreury-General. Some 520 of them are major ones. See the UN Treaty Collection,
http://untreaty.un.org (accessed 11 May 2ooS). The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University in Maryland, USA, maintains a project on multi..lateral
treaties in the Internet called Tufts Multilaterals Project (hnp:llfletcher.tufts.edu/
multilaterals.html). Its chronological index collects the major treaties since 1899
together with some hislorical documents. It would be interesting, as a separate
project, to compare China's involvement in the multilateral treaty system with
similar involvements of other countries. Such a comparative assessment could take
into consideration a country's political, economic, social and legal developments.
~ They were Jiang Qing (Mao's wife), Wang Hongwen, Zhang OlUnqiaO, and Yao
Wenyuan.
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Figure 3.2 China's Accession to International Treaties, 1949-2003 (Cumulative Sum)
to open up itself to international scrutiny, and its willingness to
shoulder some global responsibilities and to subject itself to certain
compliance tests.
In reviewing the study of international law in China, Zou
Keyuan, a Chinese legal expert based in Singapore, has identified
three periods of development: the socialist approach 0949-1%5);
the three-world approach 0%6-1977); and the international
approach 0978 to the present).37 In the current period of interna-
tional approach, the study of international law has become "nor-
malised", although traces of influence from the two earlier periods
can still be found. This current period coincides with the reform and
opening-up period in which China has acceded to or ratified a large
number of international treaties. The period represents a significant
break from the earlier revolutionary periods. One major problem
that China faces today is how to reconcile its international obliga-
tions with its domestic law, especially in the areas of human rights,
trade, environmental protection, and arms control. How to turn
37 lou Keyuan, 'Olinese approach to international law; in Hu Weixing, Gerald
Chan, and Zha Daojiong (eds), Q,ina:S internalionaJ relations in the 21$1 century
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2(00), p. 188.
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international law into domestic legislation has become a long-term
ongoing process of legal modernisation.
Two scholars at the Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington DC, James Feinerman and Daniel Chang, have complied
a record of China's compliance with some international obligations
and treaties, which shows that China's compliance behaviour is
rather mixed but has made improvements. At least it is not worse
than those of many other developing countries at a similar stage of
development.38
SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the concept of compliance in some
details and has indicated the difficulties involved in assessing the
compliance of states based on a host of domestic and international
factors, as well as different understandings of what constitutes com-
pliance among the states and international regimes involved. China's
accession to international treaties, as analysed here, serves as a
good entry point to an assessment of China's global compliance
behaviour, which needs to be examined in greater details using
in-depth case analyses, to be discussed in the follOWing chapters.
38 James V Feinerman and Daniel Chang's project on Chinese praaice of interna-
tional law in the post-Mao era, cited by, among others, A.S. Bhalla and Qiu
Shufang, The employment impact of China:S W7U QCcession (London and New
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 20(4), p. 163.
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Conclusion
China changes the world by changing iL<;elf.
Professor Yuan Mirlg, 2004 1
The rise of China has highlighted, among other things, the issue of its
responsibility in world affairs. Whether or not China is a responsible
member of the international community can best be judged not only
hy the Chinese government alone, but also, and more importantly, by
ordinary Chinese and outside ohservers. 1bis slUdy has focused on
China at the state level: How does the outside world perceive China's
responsibility and its compliance with international norms and rules?
And what is China's own view on such perceptions? From the analyses
done in the previous chapters, we can see that the Chinese govern-
ment would like very much to be seen as a responsible power, and it
does care a loe about its international image in the global community.
This book has demonstrated that a good way to begin to look at
China's international responsibility is to examine the extent of its
1 A remark made by Professor Yuan Ming, Deputy Dean, School of International
Studies, Peking University, in her public lecture on Chinese foreign policy, delivered
011 the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 18 OCtober 2004.
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involvement in world affairs. China's partlClpation in international
organisations and its membership of international regimes and
treaties serve as useful measures to gauge its global responsibility.
Membership of international organisations and regimes is a rather
simple but a basic measure, while compliance with the international
norms and rules that are embodied in these organisations and
regimes is a more refmed measure. In this regard, the book has tried
to gauge China's compliance in four crucial areas of international
relations: world trade, arms control and non-proliferation, environ-
mental protection, and human rights. China's compliance in human
rights regimes and, to a certain extent, in environmental protection
regimes, is an additional, direct indicator of its domestic responsibility
toward., its own citizens, in comparison to its compliance behaviour
in world trade and arms control.
China has made substantial progress in the four areas discussed,
since its opening up to the outside world in the late 1970s.
However, the degree of compliance varies across these areas (sum-
marised in Table 8.1), and much more work remains to be done
across the board if China were to improve its compliance image and
to meet the expectations of its major trade and strategic partners.
While the country is relatively more open in world trade practices, it
is less so in the area of ann., control and non-proliferation, as mili-
tary and defence maners are highly sensitive. The issues of human
rights and environmental protection are somewhere in between the
issue of trade on the one hand and anns control on the other in
tenns of China's degree of openness and its depth of compliance.
China has to strike a right balance between the need to engage
openly with the outside world and, at the same time, the need to
prevent other countries from exploiting these issues to intrude in its
internal affairs, thereby challenging its authority to govern as well as
limiting its potential for growth, in economic as well as political
terms. Although its compliance record (or score, for that matter)
varies, ranging from good to satisfactory in the areas of global trade
and anns control, and from fair to poor in the fields of human rights
and environmental protection, it can be concluded that China's
overall compliance record in global affairs is satisfactory to good,
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Table 8.1 Summary Findings of China's Global Compliance. 2005
No. of treaties
siKned or
ratified
Treaty
compliance
Arms Control
29+
NPT
crBT
Controversial
Global Trade
wro + a few
regional free-
trade agreements
Satisfactory;
more to be done
Human Rights
21+
ICESCR
ICCPR
Progress made;
more to be
done
Environmenul
Prcxection
40+
Kycxo Protocol
FiKhting an
uphill battle
Non- Poor
interference; undersunding
assertive of 'public
engagement goods'
Intermediate Quick
lTNCHR UNEP
USA, EU UNDP
Arnericlln DomesLic
values interests
Authority Slow progress
preservation
B- C
Fair to poor Poor
Problem areas
Nature of non-
compliance
Compliance
response
Sources of
capacity-
building
US role
China's goal
China's grade"
"lUegal" sales Agriculture;
of anns; dual- IPR;
use products transparency
Politically Transitional
sensitive problems from
socialist to
market
orienution
Slow Quick
IAEA. USA wrO. USA
EU
Sole Economic
supt:rpower supremacy
Minimal Economic
deterrence growth
B B+
Satisfa(1ory Good
Various abuses
and violations
Three Gorges;
SARS
• These grades are arbitrary but indicative. At least the'y serve as a basis for comparison. Most
analysts give China a healthy "8 plus' for il~ work under the wro after two years of
membership. according to And"",, K. Collier. 'Mainland senJes in with g10hal trade
pnooples,' Soulb CbiPia MorniPig PoSi. Internet cd., 20 September 200.3-
Ahhreviations:
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic. Social and CullUr.11 Rights
IPR Intellectual Property Rights
NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (atypical pneumonia)
UNCHR United Nations Comrni!>.~ion on Human Rights
UNDP United Nations Dc.-velopment Programme
liNEP United Nations Environment Programme
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given the difficulties that it faces in its economic, social and political
transitions, and given the fact that compliance measurement is difficult
to make. In any case, it seems that China's record is no worse than
many developing countries in a comparable stage of development.
The difficulties in making a fair and accurate assessment of the
responsibility and compliance of a countJy in global affairs lie in
different national conditions and developmental experiences, resulting
in diverse interpretations of rule compliance, in the absence of a uni-
versally-accepted standard of measurement. However, by acceding to a
large number of international treaties and participating actively in the
activities of an increasing number of inrernational organisations, espe-
cially in the areas of trade, arms control, environmental protection,
and human rights, China has deepened its integration with the rest of
the world. It has agreed to comply with the relevant international
norms and rules embodied in these treaties and organisations without
much stiff resistance or resentment in the past three decades.
This book has studied at some length China's responsibility and
compliance in global affairs in general and in the four areas in
particular. Further analyses can be made by focusing on some spe-
cific issues in the four areas and beyond, such as China's export
control of weapons, especially dual-use equipment; its control over
certain sectors of trade; its policies towards labour rights; its balanc-
ing between economic growth and environmental protection; legal,
political, and economic reforms; the linkage between domestic
responsibility and global responsibility; and so on. In complying
with international rules, China is in a process of redefining its
national interests (becoming less self<entred) and renegotiating its
state sovereignty (becoming less absolute in its understanding).Z In
2 The Chinese hold on state sovereignty has undergone~ changes in the seJ\.o;e
that it is less tenadOU5 now than before, considering the adoption of the -one
country, two systems- formula to take back Hong Kong in 1997, the signing of the
Treaty of Amity and Cooper2tion with the ASEAN countries in October 2003. and
the calling on the United States. Austnlia and some Asian countries to help to settle
its conflict with Taiwan, especiaUy in preventing Taiwan &om declaring formal
independence.
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comparative terms, auna is still very defensive of its sovereignty. In
contrast, liberal democratic states feel relatively more secure and
comfortable in the existing world order, because of their enonnous
power and strength, and because their vested interests are well
protected and promoted. At least, the US as the sole superpower
vows openly to protect and promote those interests, against any
unwelcome encroachment from non-liberal democracies. While
accepting the costs involved in participating in a wide range of
international activities, China has also reaped handsome benefits.3
Although China's compliance record looks satisfactory, disagree-
ments between China and the West, especially between China and
the United States,4 over Chinese compliance will persist, driven by
competing national interests and different perceptions and values.
Apparently, China needs outside help to build up its capacity to
comply, especially in strengthening its legal system and in streamlin-
ing its management practices. The outside world should welcome
China's compliance, as its compliance is beneficial to all parties
concerned, because of the resulting global stability and common
prosperity. In the process of global interaction, China learns to
acquaint itself with the rules of engagement with other states and
organisations. Will China internalised the relevant ideas and prac-
tices from the outside, or will it adapt tactically just to advance its
national interests? Different scholars seem to see things differently.
Alastair lain Johnston of Harvard University suggests that China
adapts rather than internalises the values and norms of international
society.5 David Lampton of johns Hopkins University and some of
his colleagues, however, argue that the distinction between adapta-
tion and internalisation is not clear, and therefore some sort of
J Ann Kent, c::::bIraa. ~ UnUed Naltons, and buman rl8bts: limits of compliance
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), pp. 3~357.
• For a critia1 review of America's record'of international legal compliance, see
Nicole Deller et al (eds). Rule of/JO&U" or rule of law (New York: The Apex Press,
20(3).
~ Alastair I. johnston. 'Le2rning versus adaptation: explaining change in 0Unese
anns oontrol policy: ",. Cbtraajoumm, No. 35 (91)6), pp. 27-61.
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combination of adaptation and learning may best describe China's
integration with the world.6 Because the process of transition to a
situation of full international compliance is so complex, fluid, and
long drawn-out, there will always be room for debates as to
whether or not China genuinely harrnonises itself with global norms
and practices. Interestingly, it is not only countries spearheaded by
the US that have to fmd a right balance between containing China
and engaging China, INGO people working in China in the human
rights field fmd that the Chinese people working in a similar field
also ·want both cooperation and continuing pressure on the
[Chinese) government, and the two have an essential synergy"? (See
Figure 8.1 for a model of China's global learning.)
Aids
Trainins
Financial
Tcdutic:aJ
Ac:tioa plaD
Enforcemcot
InfCll"melioo IDd reportis"
S<a&rity and IUIlailllhility
Political
F~ 8.1 A Model of China's Global Learning
Source: Ideas from Dr Yu Hongyuan, Lingnan Univnsity, Hong Kong, with
modiflCluons.
6 David M. tampion (ed), 7b<1 -"1/ ofCbj_fonrlgn "nd IeCUrlIypolicy in 1M
era of"'form (Stanford: Stanford UniveTSity Press, 20()\), pp. 34-35 and 22S-228.
7 Sophia Woodman, 'Bilateral aid 10 improve human rights,' anna~
No. 51 (January-February 2()()01), p. 45.
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Clearly the US plays a leading role in monitoring China's
compliance in the fields of trade, arms control, and human rights.
However, whether or not the US would play a similar role in
environmental protection is not certain, as it does not seem to com-
ply well with international environmental standards, in the area of
climate change for example.8 Nevertheless, in the newly-instituted
ministerial-level bilateral forum between the two countries, the issue
of environmental protection is included as an agenda item for
discussion. (This forum started in 2005, held in the US and the next
2006 forum is scheduled to be held in China.) Since January 2002,
the US government has been stalling the requests and efforts of UN
human rights monitors to inspect the conditions of prisoners
detained in the US detention centre at Guatanamo Bay, Cuba.9 The
US record in anm control is not inspiring either, as it pulled out of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and failed to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Its anitude and policies towards the
International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council are not
encouraging. As pointed out by scholars such as Margaret Pearson
in the field of international fmancia1 institutions and Wendy Frieman
in the field of arms control and non-proliferation, there is a difference
between China's compliance with global rules and norms on the
one hand and with the standard, agenda and national interest of the
US on the other. While the US is the only powerhouse able to
implement both controls and sanctions, the progress in the control
mechanisms are undermined by its own more general attitude of
unilateraJism.10 At the very least, US behaviour sometimes does not
inspire the confidence of other nations in the multilateral rule
system.
8 However, some American states such as CaIif<:>mi2 take actions to address the
problem of global wanning and climate change, citing the validity of scientific
evidence.~ 1V Channel <6 news, London, 22 June 2005.
9 8BC World News, 23 June 200S.
10 lbanka to Professor Ridwd Balme of the Department of Government and
1n&emationa1 Snx:hcs at the Hong Kong Baptisl University for alerting me to this, in
his e-mail correspondmce on 5 M2y 2005.
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China's global responsibility will always be chaUenged as long
as its human rights record remains flawed. Also, its worsening
environmental situation across the country only exposes the ugly
side of uncoordinated development which pays little or no regards
to environmental impact.
Trading one issue for another, such as human rights for trade, is
nO( uncommon, although the exact linkage between the two issues is
difficult to establish. For example, the US government, under the
Clinton administration, decoupled the issue of human rights from trade
with respect to China in 1994. Another example is the French and
Gennan approaches towards such a linkage. In witnessing the contract
signing ceremony in Beijing in April 2005 to seU Airbus passenger jets
to China, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Rafferin said that the anns
ban imposed on China because of the Tiananmen Incident was out-
dated and discriminatory.J1 Trade between China and France exceeded
US$13 billion in 2003, a 61 per cent increase over a year earlier.12
Given the fact that nation-states are still the main actors in
international affairs, each trying to maximise its national interests in
a largely anarchical world, what constitutes compliance in global
affairs and what sort of standards should be used to gauge compli-
ance remain contested. It seems to be a truism that throughout
human history, victors of conflicts set rules to manage others in a
post-war inter-state system and interpret those rules to their advan-
tage. This situation ensures that winners are rewarded and their
interests enhanced, while the defeated or vanquished are left with
little choice but to adhere to those rules, albeit grudgingly at flt'St in
most cases. 13 The international system that we inherit today is one
that the West, in particular the United States, dominates, in terms of
\I Sun Shangwu, 'China, France ink deals worth USS4b: Chtna Daily, lntemd ed.,
22 April 2005.
\l 'Prance backs China over Taiwan: The Associated Press, Internet ed., 2004
(accessed 27 January 20(4).
U Por a vigorous and substantive analysis along this line, see John G. Ikenberry,
After vtcIory: tnstUulions, strdtegtc restratnt, ,,,,,41 the rebuUdtns 01Of"der ajtlr major
wan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 20(1).
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rule making and rule adjudication. For instance, in the wro, all the
trade negotiation rounds have been conducted according to the
timetable of the US and a small number of advanced industrialised
countries, reflecting the interests of the West.I. In nuclear non-
proliferation, the US dominates the game. Its war against Iraq and its
policies towards Notth Korea and Iran are good indicators. In the field
of human rights, it is the West, and again the US in particular, that sets
the norms and rules for others to follow, and that chastises those who
do not. 1he primacy of states over other entities as actors in interna-
tional society means that international regimes and organisations are
often starved with resources to carry out their chartered mandates.
Although China was not exactly a defeated country in the
Second World War, it had been humiliated by Western imperialism
for a century before the end of the war and emerged thereafter as
an impoverished nation, largely ignorant of international rules and
practice. Domestic upheavals like the Great Leap Forward in the
1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s
mean that China entered or re~ntered the world stage in their after-
math as a novice, despite the reportedly brilliant performances of
individual diplomats such as Zhou Enlai in the Third World in the
1950s and Qiao Guanhua in the UN in the 1970s. International and
domestic conditions dictate that it plays the role of a follower of
international rules. For example, in the wro, China has been much
more a follower than a leader, as its delegation to the Geneva trade
talks has been small and understaffed, and as it is busy trying to
catch up with the rules and norms of the organisation as well as its
Transition Review Mechanism process. IS The same can be said of
China's participation in many las. Certainly, many domestic and
international conditions have changed dramatically in the last two to
three decades. To Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, "China is a big
14 21st~ryEamomic I/erQJd, Internet ed, 15 March 2004.
I~ Written te5timony of Margaret M. Pearson in a hearing on 'Is Otina playing by
~ rules? Free ode, fair b2de, and wro compliance,' before the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, 24 September 2003, hnp:l/www.eeec.gov
(a~ 20 October 20(4).
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enough power that its choice is not merely between obeying
the world's rules or flouting them. It may join the international
regimes ... as much in order to change them as to obey them.... "16
What China can do to change the rules that it does not like is
speculative at this stage. However, China is expected to exert
greater influence over the multilateral trading system: "It will likely
press for reform of wro anti-dumping rules, guard against anempts
to use labour and environmental issues as disguises for protection-
ism, and possibly push for reduction of agricultural subsidies. "17 To
what extent will China exert its new-found strength? Most Chinese
scholars caution the display of excessive assertiveness. Fan Xiaojun
of Shenzhen University near Guangzhou suggests that China should
neither act as a challenger nor follower. Instead, it should aim at
maximising its national interests by devoting its energy to the sening
up of regional security mechanisms and the strengthening of
regional economic interdependence. 1M Fan, of course, looks at the
situation in a very broad way. In the multitude of engagements with
the international system, it would be inevitable that China will fol-
low most of the existing rules, avoid major conflicts with the big
powers wherever possible, and try to master the intricacies of the
rules as soon as possible in order to protect its interests first before
attempting to change or revise those rules to its liking. In this way,
China is most likely to be a follower cum small challenger. Much
depends on how fast China builds up its capacity to act according to
the interest-maximisation principle. 19 It has moved away from
16 Andrew Nathan and Roben Ross, The Great Wall and the empty fortress (New
York and London: W.W. Nonon & Co., 1997), p. xiv.
17 Ramesh Adhikari and Yang Yongzheng, 'Wh:n will WTO membership mean for
China and its trading panners?' Finance & Development, a quanerly magazine of the
IMF, Vol. 39, No.3 (September 2002).
18 Fan Xiaojun, 'Canyu be peiyu guoji guanxi dRJidu jiansbe [China: to engage and
form the international order),' Guoji Guanxi Xueyuan xuebao Vournal of tbe
University ofInternational Relatiomi, Beijing, No.2 (2002), pp. 16-20 and 26.
19 Guoji guize jidingqw;ln yu Zhongguo dR weizbt l1lle struggle over international
rules and China's position). Sbijie zbisbt [World Know/edgt-i, Beijing, No.6 (2002),
p.40.
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fighting against unfair norms and unjust rules to join the status quo
of hegemonic governance. Unwittingly, it uses constructivism to
further its realism goals. Chinese scholars also recognize the role
played by big powers in developing and sustaining a rule-based
system: according to a Marxist perspective, rules exist to service the
rulers; and from a sociological point of view, rules are also made to
proted the weak and the minority so that a stable society can be
maintained to work for the benefits of the ruling class.20
The US takes on as its responsihility the leadership of the world,
China the attainment of modernity. The latter wants to see the
development of a fairer. more democratic order of international
relations based on sovereign equality. Such an international order
would be beneficial to China, as the country, being the largest
developing country in the world, still struggles as an underdog in
the current system. The US, on the other hand, works hard to
promote a free world, although it is often left unsaid what exactly
this free world is or should be. A free world can be one in which
the poor and the oppressed can aspire to achieve a higher standara
of living free of oppression; it can mean a situation in which the rich
and the powerful, because of the resources available to them, can
exercise its freedom to further "exploit" the poor and lock the
developing world firmly in an unequal system of exchange; or it can
be both. for their respective ideological reasons, the Chinese
government would not say that it will promote a freer world, nor
would the US government say that it will promote a fairer and more
democratic order of international relations (to be distinguished from
the development of individual democracies in accordance with
American instrudions and allied to the US). Both countries, however,
would say that they have a (domestic) democratic system, although
one is SOCialist, and the other liberal.
for the rich and the poor countries of the world to work
together cooperatively, there must be some kind of modus operandi
that is acceptable to both sides. In the wro, the poor member
1O Ibid., p. 43.
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states are accorded with developing country status, called 'special
and differential treatment", under which they are allowed to have
some leeway to bring themselves in line with the rules of the organ-
isation. They are given less stringent terms of membership or a
longer time to reach full compliance. China is accorded with such a
status, but because of its economic size and its potential for growth,
many rich member states of the wro were worried, and they nego-
tiated with China to lay down strieter conditions for its membership.
They are cautious not to give away too much.21
In the climate change regime, under the concept of 'common
but differentiated responsibWry", countries such as China and India
are exempted from reducing their emission of greenhouse gases
because of their development-<:ountry status, whereas aU members
of the industrialised world have to apply various measures to cut
down their emission of such gases. The US says that the generous
treatment of China and India is unfair and is one of the reasons why
the US pulled out of Kyoto Protocol. In the field of human rights,
there is the well-known debate berween liberal democrades and
authoritarian states about universal rights versus relative rights
and about the linkage berween different stages of development and
the observance of human rights standards. In the area of non-
proliferation, the US acts as if it is the fmal arbiter as to who has the
right to develop nuclear energy, not to mention the development of
nuclear weapons. According to Randall Peerenboom, in interna-
tional law, "the doctrine of 'margin of appreciation' allows SlaleS a
certain latitude in determining what restrictions are necessary based
" For eX2mple, under the so-called transitional produet-spedfic safeguard mecha-
nism, which will be effective for 12 years after China's entry into the WTO, Olina's
trade panners may impose restrictions on Chinese importa based on -marker
disruption or the threat ol market disruption". This is much stringent than the
normal WTO standard, which allows the imposition ol import restrictions only if
there is ·serious injury" or a "threat of serious injury". A special safeguard
mechanism is in place until 2008 to restrict Chinese export ol textile products after
the phasing OUI ol. global quota on t January 200'S. See AdhiItarI and Yang, 'What
will WTO membership mean for China and ita lrading partners?' See foocnoce 77 ol
Chapter 4.
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on the particular circumstances of that state. The latitude varies
according to the area of concern, with states tending to have more
leeway regarding determinations of what is necessary to ensure
national security and stability... .'·22 The precise latitude of this "margin
of appreciation- becomes the bone of contention between the
world's rich countries and their poor cousins in international
regimes. A vivid example is China's copyrights record. In a media
interview, Jin Xu, the deputy head of the American affairs division
of China's Ministry of Commerce, said that "China's intellectual
property protection doesn't have as long a history as the United
States, but we've been making the fastest progress in the world. "23 A
similar situation can be found in China's participation in many inter-
national organisations and its establishment of rule of law in the
country. Should the world, especially those countries in economic
and political competition with China, give it some leeway? How
much should the leeway be? These questions will no doubt persist,
as China further integrates with the rest of the world.
Given the fact that China enters the world of international
regimes and rules which have been shaped by the West, its partici-
pation in these regimes and rules is, by necessity and like most
other countries in a similar situation. guided by choice and selec-
tion. This is so despite observations made by analysts like Ann Kent
that "China's selective adaptation to globalisation, and its unwilling-
ness to accept its concomitant responsibilities of transparency,
openness and accountability, had created a heavy burden. not only
for the government, but [also] for its people and for its relations with
the rest of the world. "24 To Chinese leaders, national interest is
paramount. For those regimes and rules which are in the main
U Randall Peerenboom, CbtruJ's Long Marcb toward rule of law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 97.
23 Chris Buck.ley, 'US offICial gives China a last nudge on pir.lcy: International
Herald 1Wburw, Inr~ ed., 1<4 January 2005.
U Ann Kenr, 'Qlina's growth treadmill: globalization, human rights and interna-
tional relations: The Review ofInlemational AjJam.. Vol. 3, No. 4 (Summer 20(4),
p.538.
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technical in nature, like science and sJX>Its, China can make a qUick
decision to engage with them. For those which are largely institu-
tional in nature, dealing with imJX>rtant issues of JX>litics like the UN
and the wro, China usually takes a longer time to consider
carefully the pros and cons of membership, and negotiation for
entry can take a long time. For those which are mainly cultural and
social in nature, like the issue of human rights, China can resist
some of the norms and rules, and take measures to protea its own
interests and defend its own views. Learning to play by the rules of
the international game is a long process, as China adjusts and adapts
wherever JX>ssible, taking into consideration its domestic conditions
and external pressures. Flexibility and pragmatism is the order of
the day, a far cry from the days of Mao more than a quaner of a
century ago.25 China's selective and conditional engagement with
the world is not particularly Chinese. Other developing countries as
well as developed countries also base their foreign JX>licy behaviour
on their respective calculations of national interests.
Ultimately, whether or not China can carry out its duties as a
resJX>nsible member of the international community, as seen by
itself and others, depends very much on how well it can tackle its
domestic problems in the foreseeable future. According to the
People's Daily, a group of 98 Chinese experts, many of whom are
drawn from top think tanks such as the Chinese Academy of
Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, predias that
China faces huge challenges posed by ten problems before 2010:26
1. The problem of unemployment;
2. Problems associated with rural development, agriculture, and
the plight of farmers;
3. The problem of fInance;
4. The gap between the rich and the poor;
~ The idea of this paragraph comes from Wang Ylzhou. Zbongguo ftM!qi Y" guoji
biu [The rise of China and international rules): Guoj1 jingji ping/un
[JnlemationDJ Ecorwmic Revteuj, Nos 3-4 (191)8).
16 People's Daily, Internet ed., 2 September 2004.
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5. The question of ecology and resources;
6. The Taiwan issue;
7. The question of g1obalisation; .
8. Structural problems in its political, economic, and social systems;
9. The problem of confidence and creditability; and
10. The problem of AIDS and public hygiene.
Other scholars also identity problems such as reform of the state-
owned enterprises, the development of a social safety net, education
investments and reform, the management of NGOs, and so on.27
Under the rubric of political and social problems, lots of issues
deserve attention, including the issue of corruption, the establish-
ment of a legal system., the reform of the political system, relations
between the Party and the people, and others.28 Considering the
myriad of factors involved, predicting China's future is a hazardous
task, a fact readily acknowledged by many China watchers.
The Chinese government puts its faith on economic growth as a
way to consolidate its rule. However, as pointed out in Chapter 6,
environmental degradation has already started to eat substantially
into this growth. Besides, China's economic structure is potentially
unstable. Despite its phenomenal economic growth in the past two
decades, many people stiU live in abject poverty. In the countryside,
800 million people or some 60 per cent of the country's population
have an average income of less than one US doUar a day.29 Worse
r7 The view of Ding YIUllZU, a research feUow of the National Development and
Reform Commission under the State Council, cited in the Friends of Nature website,
http://wwwJon.org.cn/forum/showthread.php?threadid-3874 (assessed 22 July
2003).
1Il Charles Wolf. a fellow at Ibnd and the Hoover Institution in the US cites eight
problems that China faces in its development: unemployment, corruption,
HIV/ AIDS and epidemic disease, water resources and polIution, energy consump-
tion and prices, fragility of the fmanciaJ system and state-<)wned enterprises, possi-
ble shrinkage of foreign direct investment, and Taiwan and other potential conflicts.
See awtes Wolf. 'Eight threats to China's economic miracle,' SouIb China Morning
PosI., lnlerne( ed, 7 August 2003.
19 1be Economist, Internet ed, 7 April 2005.
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than that, China's rich-poor gap is the worst in the world. A swvey
conducred by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences shows that in
2002, half the wealth gap in China was accounted for by urban-rural
divide. Moreover, there was a growing gap within urban areas,
between the ordinary working class and the new middle and super-
rich classes. The top five and ten per cent of earners in China
accounted for 19.8 per cent and 31.9 per cent respectively of the
country's revenue in that year.30 Considering the faa that China is
ruled by a strong authoritative government, and given the submissive
nature of its ordinary folks to authority, a feature nurtured through
centuries of culture, China's fragile economic stru<.1Ure may still be
kept under control and may move forward without a total collapse.~l
Although China's increasing compliance with the rules of the
existing international treaty system has helped to move the world as
a whole towards greater convergence in values and identities, diver-
gences will no doubt continue to exist in the foreseeable future. The
"end of history" a la Francis Fukuyama is not yet in sight in any
clear-cut way.
China has been described as negatively or passively responsible
in world affairs rather than positively or actively responsible.32 The
same can be said of the nature of its compliance. The country has a
culture of authoritativeness and submission, and of rule by law
rather than rule of law. Because of this cultural background and its
generally low level of modernisation, China can hardly be expected
to take a lead in changing the global order on its own or on behalf
of the Third World. It could join collective Third World efforts initi-
ated by others. The Group of 21, which China supports, is led by
Brazil, South Africa, India, Argentina, and others. But the sheer size
of its economy makes its presence a major force to be reckoned with.
30 The Dally Telegraph, 27 February 2004, p. 18.
31 I borrow this idea from a conversation with Joseph Chan, an independent
researcher in Hong Kong, 15 May 2005.
12 Harry Harding, book review on Elizabeth Economy and Michael Oksenberg
(eds), China joins the world: progress andprospects (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1999), The China Quar1erly, No. 161 (March 20(0), pp. 304-305.
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The call for a united front to conduct world trade negotiations,
adopted by the Asia-African Summit in Jakarta in April 2005, was a
collective effort rather than a particularly strong Chinese initiative. The
only notable exceptions to this phenomenon are the Boao Forum and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where China has been
actively involved in a leadership role, in setting up the institutional
stlUetures as well as in shepherding their development. China's multi-
lateral diplomacy is constrained by a number of systemic factors,
including its domestic developmental problems, its weak legal cul-
ture, its low level of general education,33 its fragile comprehensive
national power, its limited resources to train enough qualified dipl<r
mats to adequately manage its expanding scope of foreign affairs, and
the language difficulties in international diplomacy (English being the
lingua franca). China has a long way to go, and a lot more to learn in
the process in order to become a world-class, normal power. The
growth of a nascent civil society and the increasing use of the Internet
may lead to more openness and transparency, and slightly greater
degree of freedom and democracy, but the existence of dvil sodety Lo;
only a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.34 NGOs can serve as
agents for change, but other factors are needed to help to generate a
democratic system. In any case, the influence of NGOs in the country
still lags very much behind that of the state and the market, and their
activities are checked and controUed by the state, so much so Michael
Frolic calls it "state-led civil society" with Chinese characteristics,35
although NGOs may sow "seeds of democracy".36
j} China spends 2.5 per cent 01 its annual budget on compulsory free education,
compared with 4 per cent on the average for developing countries. See Corrunittee
on Economic, Social and Culnual Rights Review Initial Report of OUna, 29 April 2005.
~ Yang Guobin cautions agaimt an overly optimistic view of the role of the Internet
in the development of civil society in O1ina. See his 'The Internet and civil society
In China: a preliminary assessment,' joumaJ ojConsempomry CbtPUl, Vol. 12, No. 36
(August 20(3), pp. 4S}.-475.
's B. Michael Frolic, 'Scate-led civil society,' in Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic
(eds), Ctvtl society m aiM (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 46-67.
~ Merle Goldman, Sowin.g the seed ojdemocracy in China: poliJia:IJ reform in the
Deng XiaOJnn.g era (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University P~, 1997). Suzanne
220 Chap#. 8
In the process of moving itself out of isolation, China faces some
fundamental structural problems in the international community,
as the core values, institutional designs, behavioural norms, and
decision-making processes as well as the style of international
regimes are Western-<>rientated.37 China may choose to remain in
the margin of global development, but if it wants to continue to
open up and engage with the outside world, it has to choose either
to participate selectively in international regimes, or merge with
them completely, or together with other frustrated participants
change those values and norms.38 It is a hard, if not a cruel, choice!
Ogden uses me tenn -inklings of democracy· in her book entitled InJnng of
democTrKy in Q,tna (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 20(2).
~ Liu lie, ftftbua sbengcun: ZbonfJ8uo beptnsjuBqt de zbanJue jue:J:e~
[sic); tbe strategic choice in the course of CbiPUl:J petlCeftU~ (Beijing: Shishi
chubanshe, 20(4), p. 6.
38 lbtd., pp. 296-m.
